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Article 82 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, provides
a novel obligation in international law that is likely to become operative within the
decade. It establishes an international royalty on production from the utilization of
non-living resources (such as oil and gas) on the continental shelf beyond 200 nauti-
cal miles, but within the outer limit of a coastal state's jurisdiction. Producing states
will have an obligation to make payments or contributions in kind that are calculated
on the basis of an incremental rate applicable as from the sixth year of production
and reaching a ceiling of 7% of production by the twelfth year The receipts are to
be paid to the International Seabed Authority and in turn will be distributed to other
states parties to the UN Convention, in particular to developing countries. At this
time it is unclear how this provision will be implemented. Canada has an interest in
this provision because it is already issuing exploration licenses in the royalty-eligible
areas of its Atlantic continental shelf. This paper explains this provision, highlights
interpretative difficulties and discusses issues of international royalty implementation
in the Canadian context.
L'article 82 de /a Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer (UNCLOS)
de 1982 impose, en droit international, une nouvelle obligation qui prendra
vraisemblablement effet au cours des dix prochaines ann6es. II 6tablit des
contributions internationales au titre de I'exploitation des ressources non biologiques
(p. ex., le p6trole et le gaz) du plateau continental au-dela de 200 milles marins, mais
en deq.a de la limite ext6rieure du territoire qui est du ressort de I'Etat c6tier. Les
Etats producteurs ont I'obligation d'acquitter chaque ann6e, 6 compter de /a sixieme
ann6e de production, des contributions en nature etablies selon un taux progressif
qui atteint un plafond de 7 pour cent de I'ensemble de la production la douzieme
ann6e. Les contributions sont vers6es 6 I'Autorite internationale des fonds marins qui
les distribue entre les Etats signataires de la Convention, en particulier aux pays en
d6veloppement Pour l'instant, la fagon dont cette disposition sera mise en ceuvre
n'est pas claire. Le Canada a un int~r~t dans cette disposition parce qu'il d61ivre
d6j des permis d'exploration dans les zones de son plateau continental Atlantique
vis6es par I'article 82 de I'UNCLOS. Cet article explique I'article 82, fait ressortir les
difficult6s que souleve son interpr6tation et discute de questions relatives a /a mise en
ceuvre des redevances intemationales dans le contexte canadien.
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Introduction
Since the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UN-
CLOS I) in 1958, Canada has consistently played an important role in the
development of the law of the sea. Much of that role has been played either
in negotiation fora, such as Canadian attempts to broker a seaward limit
for the territorial sea and fishing zone at UNCLOS II in 1960, or through
measured unilateral actions, such as the Arctic Waters Pollution Preven-
tion Act,' which influenced the development of environmental jurisdiction
in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) at UNCLOS III between 1973-1982
and its insertion in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
1982 (LOS Convention).' Canada became a party to the LOS Convention
1. R.S.C. 1985, c. A-12
2. The Law of the Sea: Official Text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with
Annexes and Index (New York: United Nations, 1983).
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on 6 November 2003 and is poised to contribute yet again to the develop-
ment of the law of the sea, this time with reference to a ground-breaking
international royalty. Under Article 76 of this instrument Canada may
claim an extended continental shelf that extends far beyond the 200-
nautical mile (M) exclusive economic zone (EEZ). According to Article 82
the development of the non-living resources of this new ocean real estate
is subject to a royalty payable to the International Seabed Authority, a
new intergovernmental organization. Offshore oil and gas exploration off
Canada's Atlantic coast recently has moved outside the 200M limit and
any future production in this area will become "royalty eligible." It ap-
pears that at this time few coastal states have discovery licence activity on
the extended continental shelf.3 Accordingly, Article 82 may well be first
tested by Canada or the United States and possibly within the decade.
Article 82 states that:
1. The coastal State shall make payments or contributions in kind in
respect of the exploitation of the non-living resources of the continen-
tal shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
2. The payments and contributions shall be made annually with respect to
all production at a site after the first five years of production at that site.
For the sixth year, the rate of payment or contribution shall be one per cent
of the value or volume of production at the site. The rate shall increase
by one per cent for each subsequent year until the twelfth year and shall
remain at seven per cent thereafter. Production does not include resources
used in connection with exploitation.
3. A developing state which is a net importer of a mineral resource pro-
duced from its continental shelf is exempt from making such payments or
contributions in respect of that mineral resource.
4. The payments or contributions shall be made through the Authority,
which shall distribute them to States Parties to this Convention, on the
basis of equitable sharing criteria, taking into account the interests and
3. For a general discussion on this see Victor Prescott, "National Rights to Hydrocarbon Resources
of the Continental Margin Beyond 200 Nautical Miles," in Gerald Blake, et al., eds., Boundaries and
Energy: Problems and Prospects (London: Kluwer Law, 1998), especially at 75-78. See also Global
Non-Living Resources on the Extended Continental Shelf: Prospects at the Year 2000, Technical
Study: No. 1. (Kingston: International Seabed Authority, 2000).
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needs of developing states, particularly the least developed and the land-
locked amongst them.
4
This paper builds on an earlier article by the authors suggesting Ar-
ticle 82 has not been addressed by either the Canadian petroleum law
regime or the Oceans Act,5 and that it is likely to be an issue for offshore
development in the Atlantic region.6 This paper examines the LOS Con-
vention provision in question, explains its content, attempts to explain how
the international royalty might apply in the absence of a suitable precedent
and identifies its potential consequences. As part of the discussion, this
paper also addresses the law and administrative process for determining
the outer limits of the extended continental shelf. The diplomatic history
of the law of the sea shows that the acquisition of an extended continental
shelf by broad margin states was an integral part of a package that includ-
ed the international royalty. Given the dearth of literature on this subject,
the paper explores potential problems of interpretation of Article 82 and
its implementation.7
I. The Extended Continental Shelf
Prior to UNCLOS III, the full geographical extent of coastal state rights
over the continental shelf were uncertain. Whereas the coastal state had a
right to a continental shelf, in theory this right did not extend to the entire
continental margin; however, the exploitability criterion in Article I of the
4. Supra note 2, Article 82. The reader will note that Article 82 speaks of "payments" and "con-
tributions in kind" rather than of royalties or taxes. Given the basis upon which such payments and
contributions are to be made (based on production of non-living resources) it is the view of the authors
that this is most accurately described as a royalty and therefore that terminology is used consistently
throughout this paper. Such payments or contributions are effectively an international royalty obliga-
tion of the producing state to the International Authority under the LOS Convention.
5. S.C. 1996, c. 31, s. 17.
6. Aldo Chircop & Bruce A. Marchand, "Oceans Act: Uncharted Seas for Offshore Development
in Atlantic Canada?" (2001) 24 Dal. L.J. at 30-32.
7. See especially Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne, vol. eds., United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. 2 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), commen-
tary on Part VI, Article 82, at 930-947; Michael W. Lodge, "The International Seabed Authority: Its
Future Directions," paper presented at the Conference on Legal and Scientific Aspects of Continental
Shelf Limits, Reykjavik, Iceland, 25-27 June 2003. Brief discussions can be found in: D.P. O'Connell,
The International Law of the Sea, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) at 507; S. C. Vasciannie,
Land-Locked and Geographically Disadvantaged States in the International Law of the Sea (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1990), at 126-129; Prescott, supra note 3 at 78-79; R. R. Churchill & A.V. Lowe, The
Law of the Sea, 3d ed. (Manchester: Juris Publishing, Manchester University Press, 1999) at 156-157.
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Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958, could have eventu-
ally led to claims encompassing the continental margin.8 This uncertainty
was resolved not through unilateralism, but by virtue of negotiations at
UNCLOS III. Thus, at law, the specific inclusion of the entire continental
margin within the rights of the coastal state (including when this extended
beyond 200M), was not the product of custom, but rather a negotiated
outcome of UNCLOS III. The coastal state entitlement to a normal and
extended continental shelf is provided in Article 76 of the LOS Conven-
tion. It is useful to distinguish between the normal and extended continen-
tal shelf entitlement because Article 82 does not apply to the former.
1. Normal Continental Shelf Entitlement
In general, the LOS Convention defines the continental shelf as:
... the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its
territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to
the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend
to that distance.
9
The entitlement is based on a combination of geographical and distance
criteria. Prior to the LOS Convention, the Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf defined the Continental Shelf as:
(a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast
but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, be-
yond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed
and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.
10
The negotiators of the 1958 convention did not have the continental
margin in mind when they purposefully chose the continental shelf as a
concept; however, the vague and open-ended reference to exploitability
enabled expansionist claims beyond what was intended by the drafters
8. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Geneva, 29 April 1958, U.N.T.S. No. 7302, vol. 499, pp.
312-321, Article I.
9. Supra note 2, Article 76(1).
10. Supra note 8. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969, confirmed that the continental shelf
doctrine had become customary international law; Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, 3.
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of that treaty." Exploitability opened the door to "creeping jurisdiction"
by states that could invoke technological development as a legitimate ba-
sis for new exclusive claims. In the LOS Convention, Article 76 was an
attempt to fully define and put an end to creeping jurisdiction by, on the
one hand, including the continental margin in the legal definition of the
shelf and, on the other, providing a distance criterion which acted as both
entitlement and limit to the shelf claim.' 2 For the majority of coastal states,
therefore, the normal shelf entitlement is capped by a 200M limit.
2. Extended Continental Shelf Entitlement
For those coastal states whose continental margin extends beyond 200M
(i.e., so called broad margin states), the LOS Convention provides them
with the possibility of claiming an extended continental shelf. There are as
many as fifty or more coastal states in a position to do so.13 "Extended," is
not a legal term and is a simplified reference to margin extensions outside
200M. The outer limit of the extended shelf may be defined by either of
two methods:
(i) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to the
outermost fixed points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary
rocks is at least 1 per cent of the shortest distance from such point to the
foot of the continental slope; or
11. This concern was brought out in the seminal speech of Ambassador Arvid Pardo, Permanent
Representative of Malta to the United Nations, which led to UNCLOS III and eventually the LOS
Convention. See "Ocean Space, Seabed, Common Heritage of Mankind," First Statement to the First
Committee of the General Assembly, 1 November 1967, in Arvid Pardo, The Common Heritage: Se-
lected Papers on Oceans and World Order 1967-1974 (Malta: Malta University Press, 1975) at 1-41
[Pardo, Common Heritage].
12. The other limitation is similar claims by neighbouring coastal states, especially in enclosed or
semi-enclosed seas.
13. During UNCLOS III it was thought that there were thirty-three broad margin states. Prescott used
maps produced by the U.S. State Department (1973) and the United Nations (1977) to conclude that
there are twenty-nine margins wider than 200M, possibly involving fifty-six coastal states; Prescott,
supra note 3 at 55-59. The precise number of claims depends on whether oceanic, and not only con-
tinental ridges, may be included. One estimate is thirty to forty states; see George Taft, "Solving the
Ridges Enigma of Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea," online: <http:
//www.gmat.unsw.edu.au/ablos/TAFT.PDF> (accessed on 16 July 2003). A more recent study by Car-
rera focusing on regions suggests that the number of claimant states could be significantly higher than
anything estimated to date. See Galo Carrera, "Geographical Scope and Scientific Challenges posed
by Article 76 to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea," presented at UNCLOS and
the Delineation of the Continental Shelf: Opportunities and Challenges to States, a Commission on the
Continental Shelf Open Meeting, Seventh Session, Trusteeship Council, UN Headquarters, New York,
I May 2000; see also Peter Croker, "The Mandate and Work of the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf" (ibid.).
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(ii) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to fixed
points not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the continental
slope."
Paragraph 7 provides for the delineation of the seaward limit through the
use of straight lines not exceeding 60M connecting fixed points. For the
purposes of (ii), the foot of the slope "shall be determined as the point of
maximum change in the gradient at its base."' 5 In both (i) and (ii) the fixed
points must not exceed 350M from the coast or 100M from the 2,500-me-
tre isobath.'6 As can be discerned from the treaty text, these provisions
contain much technical complexity and will necessitate a significant
amount of scientific knowledge of a given area in order to be applied. This
has been recognized by the United Nations Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf, an international body of experts set up and charged
by the LOS Convention to receive and consider submissions by coastal
states for the determination of the seaward limit of the shelf.'7 As tasked
by the LOS Convention, the Commission has produced guidelines to guide
states in their submissions. 8 The Russian Federation is the first coastal
state to make such a submission to the Commission. 9
In Canada, the Oceans Act defines the continental shelf in a manner
consistent with the text of Article 76:
(1) The continental shelf of Canada is the seabed and subsoil of the sub-
marine areas, including those of the exclusive economic zone of Canada,
that extend beyond the territorial sea of Canada throughout the natural
prolongation of the land territory of Canada
(a) subject to paragraphs (b) and (c), to the outer edge of the conti-
nental margin, determined in the manner under international law that
14. LOS Convention, supra note 2, Article 76(4)(a).
15. Ibid.,Article 76(4)(b).
16. Ibid., Article 76(5). However, note Article 76(6) which provides that "Notwithstanding the pro-
visions of paragraph 5, on submarine ridges, the outer limit of the continental shelf shall not exceed
350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. This
paragraph does not apply to submarine elevations that are natural components of the continental mar-
gin, such as plateaux, rises, caps, banks and spurs." The latter sentence suggests that if the mentioned
geomorphological features are present, the 350M limit may not necessarily apply.
17. Ibid.,Annex II.
18. Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continentals Shelf, CLCS/Rev. 3 (6
February 2001); Modus Operandi of the Commission, CLCS/L.3 (12 September 1997); Scientific and
Technical Guidelines of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, CLCS/I 1 (13 May
1999) and CLCS/l l/Add. (3 September 1999).
19. "Russian Federation First to Move to Establish Outer Limits of its Extended Continental Shelf,"
UN Press Release, SEA/1729, 12 December 2001.
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results in the maximum extent of the continental shelf of Canada, the
outer edge of the continental margin being the submerged prolonga-
tion of the land mass of Canada consisting of the seabed and subsoil
of the shelf, the slope and the rise, but not including the deep ocean
floor with its oceanic ridges or its subsoil;
(b) to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines of the ter-
ritorial sea of Canada where the outer edge of the continental margin
does not extend up to that distance; or
(c) in respect of a portion of the continental shelf of Canada for
which geographical coordinates of points have been prescribed
pursuant to subparagraph 25(a)(iii), to lines determined from the
geographical coordinates of points so prescribed. 20
Canada is a broad margin state in a position to claim extended shelves
under (a) in the Atlantic and Arctic regions.2' In the Pacific, where it is
determined that the continental margin is not as extensive, a continen-
tal shelf in accordance with (b) applies. No precise outer limits for the
extended continental shelf have been established in any of Canada's
oceans. However, the legislated outer limits are deemed to apply despite
lack of precise determination and the absence of any current regulations
to this effect by the Governor in Council. Should any doubt arise as to
whether a particular area falls within the continental shelf of Canada,22 a
certificate by the Minister of Foreign Affairs would be determinative of
the issue.23 This executive certification is useful for Canadian domestic
purposes (i.e., governmental and court jurisdiction). Eventually, it is ex-
pected that precise outer limits in the Atlantic and Arctic regions will be
set out by the Governor in Council through regulation. 24 Full international
recognition of a formal determination of outer limits requires successful
completion of the LOS Convention procedure described below.
20. Supra note 5.
21. Ron McNab, ed., "Canada and Article 76 of the Law of the Sea: Defining the Limits of Canadian
Resource Jurisdiction beyond 200 Nautical Miles in the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans," Geological
Survey of Canada, Open File 3209 (Dartmouth, NS: Geological Survey of Canada, 1994). The Pacific
region is mentioned as having a potential for a broad margin claim in US and UN studies cited by
Prescott, supra note 3. However, it is doubtful that a strict application of Article 76 would result in an
extended shelf in the Canadian Pacific.
22. "For greater certainty, paragraphs (1)(a) and (b) apply regardless of whether regulations are
made pursuant to subparagraph 25(a)(iv) prescribing geographical coordinates of points from which
the outer edge of the continental margin or other outer limit of the continental shelf of Canada may be
determined." Supra note 5, s. 17(2).
23. Ibid., s. 23.
24. Ibid., ss. 25(a)(3) and (4).
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The Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board (CNOPB) has
issued several exploration licences, and at least one significant discovery
licence, for operations outside the 200M limit.25 Exploration licences for
parcels beyond the 200M limit have been issued to Petro-Canada, Esso,
Mobil, Husky, ExxonMobil and others and their respective partners. Most
of the wells drilled to date under exploration licences have been aban-
doned. The North Dana 1-43 well, for which a significant discovery license
was issued to Mobil and partners, has also been abandoned. Petro-Canada
drilled the Mizzen L- 11 well in early 2003.
The CNOPB has issued a call for bids NF03-1 for fourteen parcels,
all but two of which are located, in whole or in part, beyond the 200M
limit.26 The issues of determination of the seaward limits of the extended
continental shelf and the international royalty payable under Article 82
are, and will be, of great interest to a number of oil and gas companies
involved in the Atlantic Canada offshore. A significant amount of activity
and interest has been, and will be, focused beyond the 200M limit, particu-
larly on offshore Newfoundland and Labrador, and possibly on offshore
Nova Scotia.
3. Procedure For Claiming an Extended Continental Shelf
The procedure that Canada would have to go through in order to finalize
the seaward limits of the extended continental shelf and ensure their full
international recognition is set out in Annex II of the LOS Convention
and the guidelines developed by the UN Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf. The UN Commission's functions are to provide
scientific and technical advice in data preparation, to consider submis-
sions by broad margin states and to make recommendations thereto in
accordance with Article 76.27 Canada would be required to submit partic-
ulars of intended limits and supporting scientific and technical evidence.
25. The North Dana significant discovery license is the first such license outside 200M. For in-
formation on the various exploration licenses outside 200M off Newfoundland, see online: CNOPB
<www.cnopb.nfnet.com>.
26. Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board: Newfoundland Grand Banks/Flemish Pass
map dated July 2003 at CNOPB website, ibid.
27. Supra note 2, Annex II, Art. 3. In relation to the Bay of Bengal, the Commission is also required
to refer to the Statement of Understanding Concerning a Specific Method to be Used in Establishing
the Outer Edge of the Continental Margin, in Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, 1982, Annex II, in The Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at 183-184. The Commission
operates through Sub-Commissions, but the final decision on recommendations to the coastal state is
taken by the Commission.
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The Commission does not have regulatory authority and where it disagrees
with the contents of a state submission, it can only provide recommenda-
tions to the submitting state. In reality, however, the LOS Convention has
empowered the Commission to legitimize extended shelf claims.2 8 The
Commission has had opportunity to provide the Russian Federation with
such recommendations. Where the coastal state disagrees with the recom-
mendations provided, it may make a revised or new submission.29 The
LOS Convention is silent as to what happens if a coastal state decides not
to re-submit or if differences with the Commission are not resolved. The
current Russian reaction to the Commission's recommendations is a test
case to be monitored.
The Geological Survey of Canada has already taken preliminary steps
in preparation for a future Canadian claim. There are several preliminary
questions that will need to be addressed not only at the scientific and
technical level, but also at high levels of policy-making as part of a cost-
benefit analysis at the national level.3' Beyond a desktop study, more
geodetic, geological, geophysical and hydrographic data will be needed
to buttress potential claims for an outer limit as far seawards as 350M
and satisfy the international scientific and technical scrutiny imposed
by the Commission.3' In addition to data submission, Canada will be
expected to explain technical procedures and scientific methodologies
employed in its implementation of Article 76. State parties have ten years
to make such claims.32 Canada will have until December 2012 to make a
submission to the Commission (i.e., ten years since ratification of the LOS
Convention).33
28. On the role of the Commission as a legitimator of claims and issues of hierarchy of evidence
before this body, see Cockburn, S. Nichols, D. Monahan & T. McDorman, "Intertwined Uncertainties:
Policy and Technology on the Juridical Continental Shelf," in Proceedings of the Advisory Board on
the Law of the Sea to the International Hydrographic Organization (ABLOS) Conference "Accuracies
and Uncertainties in Maritime Boundaries and Outer Limits." Presented at the International Hydro-
graphic Bureau, Monaco, October 2001.
29. Supra note 2, Annex II, Art. 8.
30. See Galo Carrera & Alexandre Alubuquerque, "An Outline for the Preparation of a Submission
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf," CLCS Open Meeting, supra note 13.
31. See press comment by Jacob Verhoef, Atlantic Director, Geological Survey of Canada, in
"Canada Eyes Bigger Offshore Claim," online: CBC News <www.cbc.ca> (accessed 14 July 2003).
32. Supra note 2, Annex II, Art. 4. This rule has been, in effect, modified by the Eleventh Meeting
of States Parties to the Convention (SPLOS/72) for those states for whom the Convention entered into
force before 13 May 1999. In the case of these states the 10-year period commenced on 13 May 1999.
See Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, online: United Nations <http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/clcs new/continentalshelfdescription.htm> (accessed 16 July 2003).
33. For those state parties that ratified the LOS Convention after it came into force, such as Canada,
the convention enters into force 30 days from the date of deposit of the instrument of ratification. LOS
Convention, supra note 2, Article 308(2).
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I. Development of The International Royalty: The Diplomatic
History ofArticle 82
In order to better interpret the intent and meaning of Article 82, it is useful
to review the history of the negotiations, which led to the final wording of
that article.
More than twenty years after the adoption of the LOS Convention, the
close relationship between Articles 76 and 82 is hardly mentioned in the
academic literature. Yet, from the very outset of UNCLOS III, the ideas
behind the two were closely intertwined. Article 82 is a unique provision
in the LOS Convention as it is the only one that provides for an interna-
tional royalty to be levied for an activity within national jurisdiction. This
is different from the fees that registered pioneer investors have to pay
for their licences and activities in the international seabed area (which is
clearly outside national jurisdiction) and the mineral activities which fall
under the superintendence of the International Seabed Authority.34
The national appropriation of the extended continental shelf was con-
sidered by many at UNCLOS III as an encroachment on the international
seabed area, and thus on the common heritage of mankind. In his famous
1967 UN speech, Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta had proposed that
(1) The seabed and the ocean floor are a common heritage of mankind and
should be used and exploited for peaceful purposes and for the exclusive
benefit of mankind as a whole. The needs of poor countries, representing
that part of mankind which is most in need of assistance, should receive
preferential consideration in the event of financial benefits being derived
from the exploitation of the seabed and ocean floor for commercial
purposes.
(2) Claims to sovereignty over the seabed and ocean floor beyond present
national jurisdiction, as presently claimed, should be frozen until a clear
definition of the continental shelf is formulated.35
Pardo proposed two revolutionary ideas: (1) that national claims would
be frozen until such time as a definition that would clearly limit national
continental shelf claims would be developed; and (2) that the area outside
national jurisdiction would be developed for every nation's benefit, but
34. See Resolution II Governing Preparatory Investment in Pioneer Activities Relating to Polymetal-
lic Nodules, Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in The Law of
the Sea, supra note 2 at 177-182.
35. Pardo, "Ocean Space," 1 November 1967, in Pardo, Common Heritage, supra note II at 41.
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with preferential consideration for developing countries. In subsequent
speeches to the UN, Pardo further developed the idea that "International
Ocean Space Institutions" be responsible for the common heritage and be
given powers to allocate development rights and undertake ocean manage-
ment.36 The idea that there should be equitable sharing of benefits from
the development of the international seabed area was adopted at an early
stage.37
Pardo's revolutionary ideas were not limited to the international
seabed area. Pardo also advocated that the "coastal state should contribute
to the international institutions a percentage of the revenue received from
the exploitation of the living and non-living resources of a large zone of
ocean space within its jurisdiction."38 Within what is now the EEZ, Pardo
advocated a scale of contributions tied to the development of both living
and non-living resources that the coastal state would make to international
institutions.39
Although the 1970 UN General Assembly Resolution 2749 would
declare the international seabed area common heritage of mankind and
beyond national appropriation, it was not possible to freeze national
claims to emerging maritime zones. Consequently, creeping jurisdiction
would still continue at the expense of the common heritage until a new law
of the sea defined the outer limits of national jurisdiction. Pardo may have
failed to obtain a freeze, but he influenced many Seabed Committee 40 and
UNCLOS III delegations resist encroachments on the common heritage.
Where resistance was not possible, there had to be a quid pro quo in the
36. Pardo, "Delimitation of Legal Continental Shelf and Functions of International Regime," 20
March 1969, in ibid. at 90.
37. Referring to a future legal regime for the international seabed area, Resolution 2749 provided
that the "regime shall, inter alia, provide for the orderly and safe development and rational manage-
ment of the area and its resources and for expanding opportunities in the use thereof and ensure
equitable sharing by States in the benefits derived therefrom, taking into particular consideration
the interests and needs of the developing countries, whether land-locked or coastal." Declaration of
Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil thereof, beyond the Limits
of National Jurisdiction, UN General Assembly Resolution 2749, (XXV), 17 December 1970. There
were 108 states that voted in favour, fourteen abstentions, and with no state voting against.
38. Pardo, "From Seabed Regime to Ocean Space Regime," 23 March 1972, in Pardo, Common
Heritage, supra note II at 219.
39. Pardo envisaged four zones as follows: Area 1-100 miles from the coast: no contribution; Area
2-100-150 miles: 25%; Area 3-150-170 miles: 50%; Area 4-175-200M: 75%. Ibid., at 219-220. Writ-
ing in 1972, he optimistically guessed that around $200 million a year would be generated to the
international institutions from hydrocarbon development alone. Ibid. at 221.
40. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of
National Jurisdiction, established by UN General Assembly Resolution 2467 A (XXII), 21 December
1968.
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conference's package deal. The concept that the coastal state should share
or make a financial contribution on development within its jurisdiction for
the benefit of others would survive, albeit in an inchoate form.
The Seabed Committee was convened in 1968 by the General
Assembly to develop an agenda for the forthcoming UNCLOS III. 41 The
Committee provided a forum for Pardo's embryonic ideas. In 1971, Malta
submitted the Draft Ocean Space Treaty as an attempt to envision what a
new global law of the sea convention could look like. Within this instru-
ment, Article 61 provided:
1. The coastal state shall transfer to the International Ocean Space Institu-
tions a portion of the revenue obtained from the exploitation of the natural
resources of national ocean space.
2. The Institutions shall prepare a draft convention defining the contribu-
tion payable by coastal states to the International Ocean Space Institutions
under paragraph one of this Article and the modalities of payment.
42
Malta proposed sharing of revenue from all resource development within
national jurisdiction, to be payable to an international organization. It
stopped short of calling this innovative provision a tax or royalty, couch-
ing it instead as an obligation to make a contribution, with the moral
rationalization that this was owed to the international community. The new
maritime zones emerging at the time (especially the EEZ and the extended
continental shelf) were encompassing the majority of marine resources
and this reinforced the responsibility to share even more.4 3 Utopian as it
was, the idea would eventually be supported by the United States delega-
tions to the Seabed Committee and UNCLOS III as a key element in the
41. Ibid. The Seabed Committee operated between 1968-1973. For analysis of this committee's
work, see Annick de Marffy, La Gen~se du nouveau droit de la mer: le Comit6 desfonds marins (Paris:
A. Pedone, 1980).
42. "Draft Ocean Space Treaty," Working Paper submitted by Malta, A/AC. 138/153, in Pardo, Com-
mon Heritage, supra note II at 421.
43. See the Introduction to the Draft Ocean Space Treaty, ibid. at 387-388. The Introduction intro-
duced this Article as an "important innovation." In a footnote to Article 61 the following rationale was
put forward: "It is believed that a contribution by the coastal state of a proportion of the revenue re-
ceived through the exploitation of the natural resources of national ocean space is justified, inter alia,
by the fact that the coastal state is likely to receive benefits not otherwise easily attainable through the
rational management of natural resources beyond its jurisdiction." Ibid. at 421.
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overall compromise in a revised continental shelf regime.4
At the outset of UNCLOS III, participating states agreed that consensus
would be the guiding decision-making process, and only when all efforts
at securing consensus were exhausted would a vote be taken. It was agreed
that the resulting convention would be a package deal, thus allowing states
to negotiate freely on the details and then decide on the package as a whole.
A procedure adopted to assist consensus-building was the preparation of
occasional draft treaty texts that reflected the state of negotiations of the
overall package deal. Frequently, alternative text or text placed in square
brackets indicated items still undergoing consensus-building. These rules
of procedure were very important for the negotiation of Article 82 and, as
will be seen below, facilitated the evolution of a few, frequently compet-
ing ideas, from one draft text to another. Consensus necessarily meant that
Article 82 would be a compromise provision, both on its own and in rela-
tion to other treaty provisions. Annex I at the end of this paper provides
the different formulations of this provision in the various negotiating texts
of UNCLOS III.
Continental shelf matters during UNCLOS III were negotiated in the
Second Committee. Very early into the negotiations the extent of na-
tional sovereign rights over the continental shelf was a divisive issue and
reflected a broad spectrum of views. Clearly, many coastal states, espe-
cially broad margin states, saw this as an opportunity to advance their
claim for an extended shelf, a claim no individual coastal state would
likely have made on its own. Many developing states remained suspicious
that the continental shelf regime had primarily served the interests of
developed states and wanted this rectified.45 Land-locked and geographi-
cally disadvantaged states either opposed an extended continental shelf,
which they perceived to benefit coastal states exclusively, or expected a
44. In its summary report of the last session of the Seabed Committee (2 July-24 August 1973),
the U.S. delegation reported that some revenue sharing from mineral exploitation in the coastal state
seabed economic area was contemplated. See Myron H. Nordquist & Choon-ho Park, eds., Reports of
the United States Delegation to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Honolulu:
Law of the Sea Institute, 1983) at 45. See also Nandan & Rosenne, supra note 7 at 933.
45. See for instance the comments of the Singaporean delegate at the Second Session: "The history
of the development of the concept of the continental shelf showed that it had been evolved to serve the
interests of a few advanced developed countries. The Conference should have the courage to rectify
such injustices." Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Official Records, 2nd Ses-
sion, Caracas, 20 June-29 August 1974 (New York: United Nations, 1975) at 151.
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system of equitable compensation.46 Some land-locked states proposed
that they be granted access to mineral resources.47 One land-locked state
felt that the extension of continental shelves to the edge of the continental
margin would greatly reduce the international seabed area and that it "was
questionable whether an area so truncated to that extent would even justify
the establishment of an international authority to administer it."'4 8 Some
states felt that coastal states were entitled to the full extent of the conti-
nental shelf but that "they should share with the international community
a portion of the natural resources of their continental shelves lying beyond
200M."4 9 Other states simply objected to the notion of sharing as they
perceived a potential erosion of property rights.5°
During the Second Session in Caracas in 1974, the U.S. proposed a
compromise that provided for coastal state jurisdiction over the continen-
tal margin coupled with revenue-sharing. A Dutch proposal added a scale
of contributions using distance and depth as criteria. Although several
broad margin states continued to resist revenue-sharing and several land-
locked states opposed exclusive rights beyond 200M, the U.S. proposal
attracted support.5" By August 1974, an informal working paper contained
the first precursor provision to Article 82 with a statement of principle
that the coastal state should make contributions out of its revenue from
the development of its non-living resources, that the contributions would
be based on a scale and that the contributions would be distributed by
46. See e.g. Uganda, Official Records, 21 Session, ibid. at 151.
47. See for instance the proposals of Austria and the Group of Land-Locked and Geographically
Disadvantaged States in response to the ISNT's Article 63. A right to participation in the development
of the continental shelf of regional coastal states was claimed. They proposed, inter alia, joint ven-
tures. The Group also anticipated the need to negotiate bilateral, sub-regional and regional agreements
for this purpose. In a revision of its proposal, Austria attempted to secure preference for land-locked
states. See Second Committee Informal Proposals, in Renate Platzoder, Third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea: Documents, Vol. IV (New York: Oceana, 1983), at 323-327.
48. Switzerland, Official Records, 21d Session, supra note 45 at 157.
49. See e.g., Trinidad and Tobago, Official Records, 2n" Session, ibid. at 155.
50. Burma (now Myanmar) saw "no justification for the proposals that sought to impose on coastal
states an obligation to share with others part of the revenues derived from the exploration of the min-
eral resources of the continental shelf. The practical effect of those proposals would be to establish
a regime of mixed ownership over those resources. Any such system, however, would be a serious
encroachment on the existing rights of coastal states, and would be unacceptable ..." Official Records,
2n, Session, ibid. at 155.
51. U.S. delegation report on the Second Session, Caracas, 20 June-29 August 1974, in Nordquist &
Park, supra note 44 at 69, 72.
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an international authority.52 There was not yet agreement on the marine
area the contribution would apply to, but the early thinking considered the
possibility of areas well within the 200M limit.53 Following negotiations,
a revised version of that working paper produced an alternative (albeit
rough) formula that referred to the continental shelf, including areas out-
side the territorial sea, but had not yet focused on the extended shelf.54
By the end of the Second Session the trend appeared to be a more simpli-
fied provision, but the division between broad margin and land-locked
and geographically disadvantaged states was still very wide. Particularly
interesting at this time was the reference to net revenue, rather than the
reference to volume or production that would appear later, and that the
revenue would be distributed by the Authority on the same basis as
revenue generated from the international seabed area.55
By the end of the Third Session in 1975, there emerged a common
understanding on the basic principle that coastal states make contribu-
tions related to their development of the extended shelf. The text captured
by the Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT) on this principle would
52. Second Committee, Informal Working Paper No. 3, 5 August 1974, Provision XII, in Renate
Platzoder, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Documents, Vol. III (New York:
Oceana, 1982) 288 at 292. The paper was prepared by the Bureau and the ideas represented submis-
sions made both in the Seabed Committee and UNCLOS III.
53. "The rate of contribution shall be ... per cent of the revenue from exploitation carried out within
40 miles or 200 metres isobath of the ... zone, whichever limit the coastal State may choose to adopt,
and ... per cent of the revenue from exploitation carried out beyond 40 miles or 200 metres isobath
within the ... zone." Provision XII(2), ibid. at 292.
54. Formula B: "The coastal State in the exercise of its rights with respect to the non-renewable
natural resources of the continental shelf: (a) Shall comply with legal arrangements which it has
entered into with other contracting States, their instrumentalities, or their nationals in respect to the
exploration and exploitation of such resources; shall not take property of such States, instrumentalities
or nationals except for a public purpose on a non-discriminatory basis and with adequate provision
at the time of taking for prompt payment of just compensation in an effectively realizable form; and
(b) Shall pay, in respect of the exploitation of such non-renewable resources seaward of the territorial
sea or the 200-metre isobath, whichever is further seaward (insert formula), to be used, as specified in
Article .... for international community purposes, particularly for the benefit of developing countries."
Informal Working Paper No. 3/Rev. 1, 12 August 1974, Provision XIII, in Platzoder, supra note 47,
Vol. III at 301.
55. The two alternative formulas that emerged in Provision VIII of Informal Working Paper No. 4/
Rev. 2, 27 August 1974, were diametrically opposed. Formula A: "1. All States deriving revenues from
the exploitation of the non-living resources of the ... zone shall make contributions to the international
authority at the rate of ... per cent of the net revenues. 2. The international authority shall distribute
these contributions on the same basis as the revenues derived from the exploitation of the international
sea-bed area." Formula B: "The sovereign rights of the coastal State over its continental shelf are ex-
clusive. The revenues derived from the exploitation of the continental shelf shall not be subject to any
revenue sharing." Platzoder, supra note 47, Vol. III at 362.
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survive the various negotiating texts and find a place in the final version
of Article 82(1) (see Annex 1).56 By this time the majority of delega-
tions were in favour of the coastal state having at least 200M of EEZ and
continental shelf, and the remaining question was related to the criteria
for determining the outer limit of the shelf (now understood as margin)
where this extended beyond 200M. However, the negotiation of the
latter could not proceed without a compromise on revenue-sharing, and
this was considered to be the only way to achieve widespread support for
the text.57 Despite the advances on drafting, the Group of Land-Locked
and Geographically Disadvantaged States first lobbied for rights of partic-
ipation in the exploration and exploitation of continental shelf resources,
and when this did not proceed very far, proposed the making of payments
or contributions in kind.58 There was a proposal for a five percent rate for
the area within 200M, and ten percent for beyond, but this did not gather
sufficient support. 59 A U.S. proposal left the decision to decide the form
of the payment or contribution to the discretion of the coastal state and the
procedure would be agreed upon by parties to the convention.6' Another
proposal included a provision dealing with the failure of a coastal state to
make the required payment or contribution.6
Other major points of agreement in the ISNT text were the principle of
a graduated rate payment system and that payments would be made to an
international organization (the Authority being one possibility) for distri-
bution to developing countries (see Annex I). There was disagreement as
to whether broad margin developing states should be exempted from the
contribution.
The position of the U.S. on how revenue-sharing might work deserves
particular attention since it influenced the negotiation of the provision. At
56. Informal Single Negotiating Text, ISNT/Part II, A/CONF.62/WP.8, 7 May 1975, in Platzoder,
Vol. I, ibid., at 31.
57. U.S. delegation report on the Third Session, Geneva, 17 March-9 May 1975, in Nordquist &
Park, supra note 44 at 98-99.
58. Proposals of the Group and Austria concerning Article 69 (ISNT II), dated 11 April 1976,
Platz6der Vol. IV, supra note 47 at 325-327. Even at this stage, however, the two proposals suggested
payments and contributions concerning development on shelf areas at a depth of 200 metres or 50
miles from the coast.
59. Austria, see Platzoder, ibid., Vol. IV at 325-326.
60. U.S. proposal for Article 69 (ISNT II), in Platzbder, ibid., Vol. IV at 326.
61. ISNT II, Article 69(5) as proposed by the group of Land-Locked and Geographically Disadvan-
taged States: "If a State concerned fails to comply with the provisions of this Article the International
Authority may take appropriate measures in accordance with the powers and functions conferred upon
it by this Convention." Platzider, ibid., Vol. IV at 327.
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that time the U.S. was ready to agree to revenue-sharing outside 200M (as
compared to earlier willingness to consider sharing beyond the territorial
sea or the 200-metre isobath).62 It considered the need for an initial grace
period of five years (i.e., a period to enable some initial cost-recovery
and during which the revenue-sharing would not apply), after which the
contribution would be at the rate of one percent for the sixth year, increas-
ing thereafter by one percent per year until the tenth year when it would
reach five percent. 63 The latter figure would remain the ceiling for subse-
quent production. The reasoning was that the more economically produc-
tive phase of a well would commence after the first five years of produc-
tion. The applicable value to determine the contribution was thought to
be the wellhead value. The U.S. disagreed with an alternative proposal to
have profit-sharing instead (i.e., contribution based on the net) because of
the perceived difficulties of unpredictable costs in deep drilling and "great
difficulty in reaching agreement among States of differing economic sys-
tems on what costs can be deducted from gross profits to compute net rev-
enues." 64 In fact, the text that would finally emerge in the LOS Conven-
tion would not contain any reference to net revenue or deduction of costs
(other than production not including "resources used in connection with
exploitation"), indicating that the royalty would apply to gross production.
It seems that the expectation at the time (though it would likely cause
great difficulty today) was that developers on the extended continental
shelf were expected to recover a substantial portion of their development
costs during the grace period. From these discussions, it does not appear
that further consideration was given to ongoing production costs until the
end of the life of a field that could be deducted after the contribution rule
started to apply. Also, it seems that the hypothetical scenarios considered
were in relation to hydrocarbons, even though the payment or contribution
would apply to any non-living resource and that cost-recovery might oper-
ate very differently.
The negotiations from the Fourth to Sixth Sessions between 1976-1979
would gradually resolve many differences over coastal state contributions
and area of application. At the Fifth Session, the Second Committee es-
tablished a number of negotiating teams to focus on priority questions,
one of which (NT 6) focused on payments and contributions in respect of
the exploitation of the continental shelf beyond 200M. The discussions on
62. Ibid. at 99.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
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Article 76 continued to be closely related to those on Article 82. Indeed,
the payment or contribution was a "necessary adjunct" to a formula that
would define the continental margin either in terms of a fixed distance
from the foot of the slope or fixed sedimentary thickness.65
The Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT) contained the principal
architecture of the future Article 82 (see Annex 1).66 There was by then
more widespread support for application to the extended shelf.6 7  The
provision under negotiation at that time contained a grace period of five
years, commencement of payment in the sixth year, a scale with a gradual
increase of one percent per year, and a ceiling of five percent. But there
were still loose ends. Whereas there was agreement that the payment or
contribution be based on the value or volume of production, no final agree-
ment on the full extent of the grace period and the ceiling of the contribu-
tion was reached. This would remain the case with the first version of the
Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) (see Annex I).68 Differences
would remain also in relation to which, if any, developing countries ought
to be exempted from the obligation to share revenues and whether the
payment should be made to the Authority.69 The Netherlands submitted a
proposal that departed considerably from the then-emerging consensus.
70
These differences would finally be resolved with the first revision of the
ICNT and the full text of Article 82 as it is in the LOS Convention would
65. U.S. delegation report on the Fifth Session, New York, 2 August-17 September 1976, in Nor-
dquist & Park, supra note 44 at 150.
66. Revised Single Negotiating Text, Part II, A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev. I/Part II, 6 May 1976, in
Platzbder, supra note 47, Vol. I at 218.
67. Even the latest proposal of Austria in response to the RSNT, Article 70, had now accepted the
extended shelf as the basis of the payment or contribution. See PlatzOder, ibid., Vol. IV at 471.
68. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, A/CONE62/WP.10, 15 July 1977, in Platzdder, ibid., Vol.
I at 318.
69. For instance the US proposed the following Paragraph 4 to RSNT Article 70: "The payments or
contributions referred to in paragraphs I and 2, shall be made to an appropriate entity of the United
Nations. The Parties to this Convention shall agree on necessary payment and other relevant proce-
dures. The entity shall distribute these payments to States Parties to this Convention on the basis of eq-
uitable sharing criteria, taking into account the interests and needs of developing countries, especially
the land-locked and geographically disadvantaged among them, as well as developing countries which
have made payments or contributions in accordance with paragraph I and 2 of this article." Platzbider,
supra note 47, Vol. IV at 471.
70. Proposal for Article 82 dated 17 April 1979, in Platz6der, ibid., Vol. IV at 516. The basic
principle advanced was that any shelf extension occurring at the expense of the common heritage
would be subject to "an equitable and practicable system of revenue-sharing." It proposed that
the charge be a percentage of the gross proceeds of all sold production, with two separate periods
operating. In order for this formula to work, the proposal included supervision through independent
accountancy. Developing countries were to be exempted from the charge.
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appear (see Annex I).71 It was at that time that agreement was reached on
the maximum rate of seven percent.
Pending agreement on Article 76, consensus was about to be reached
on the final text of Article 82. Unfortunately, the land-locked and
geographically disadvantaged states were not able to achieve any
meaningful right to participate in the development of continental shelves
in the same region.72 In 1979, creative thinking on the part of this group
of states would lead to a proposal in NT 6 to establish a Common Heritage
Fund (CHF) which was fully explained in a background paper distributed
at the 1980 New York Session. 73 This would be one of the last efforts at
introducing a major new element into the emerging text of the conven-
tion to enable these states to reap more benefits. The proposal was mainly
targeted at Article 56 on the EEZ, but it also addressed Article 82. Insofar
as the EEZ was concerned, these states reasoned that the EEZ was a new
zone that was going to reduce the international seabed area, and therefore
should be subject to international payments or contributions in kind. They
stated that:
In our view the case for the CHF is very strong. In many forums the world
community has declared that it intends to establish a New International
Economic Order, based on a redistribution of global resources. However,
very little has been done to move us toward that goal. We think that the
Common Heritage Fund is a logical - if rather modest - first step to-
ward the New International Economic Order.
74
71. Informal Composite Negotiating Text/Revision One, ICNT/Rev. 1, A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.
1, 28 April 1979, in Platzider, ibid., Vol. I at 423. The subsequent negotiating texts were: Informal
Composite Negotiating Text/Revision Two, ICNT/Rev. 2, A/CONF.62/WP. 10/Rev. 2, 11 April 1980,
in Platzoder, ibid., Vol. II at 51; Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text), A/CONF.62/
WP. 10/Rev. 3, 22 September 1980, in Platzbder, ibid., Vol. II at 227; Draft Convention on the Law of
the Sea, AICONF.62/L.78, 28 August 1981, in Platzder, ibid., Vol. II at 409-410.
72. See the 1978 draft resolutions of the Group and Austria, where the demand to participate is
significantly less demanding than earlier, advocating a possibility of participation, in Platzider, supra
note 47, Vol. IV at 512-514.
73. Introduced on 17 August 1979. The original idea was advanced by Nepal in 1978. See also Let-
ter to all Heads of delegations by the Organizing Committee of the Group for the Common Heritage
Fund (signed by Austria and Nepal), 12 February 1980, in Platzider, ibid., Vol. IV at 531. The other
countries in the group were Afghanistan, Bolivia, Lesotho, Singapore, Uganda, Upper Volta and
Zambia. See also "Background Paper on the Common Heritage Fund Proposal," New York Session
1980, in Platzoder, ibid., Vol. IV at 528-530 ["Background Paper"].
74. "Background Paper," ibid. at 529
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Specifically in relation to Article 82, they proposed that the payments and
contributions were to be made to the Common Heritage Fund through
the Authority, with the intent to distribute these to developing countries
in accordance with equitable sharing criteria remaining unchanged.75
However, there was insufficient support for this novel initiative at this late
stage of the conference. By 1980, UNCLOS III had been underway for
seven years and consensus-building may have started to evidence confer-
ence fatigue. Also, as the conference continued, coastal states appeared
less inclined to consent to additional conditions to the exercise of newly
gained rights. Thus, there was little further change to Article 82 and what-
ever change occurred was cosmetic.76
The LOS Convention provides little guidance as to how Article 82
might be implemented. Some of that guidance relates to functions to be
performed within the Authority. There is specific provision on the regula-
tory tasks of the Council and the Assembly. As the executive organ of the
Authority, the Council is empowered to
... recommend to the Assembly rules, regulations and procedures on the
equitable sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived from
activities in the Area and the payments and contributions made pursuant
to Article 82, taking into particular consideration the interests and needs
of developing States and peoples who have not attained full independence
or other self-governing status...77
The final consideration and approval of any such rules, regulations and
procedures lies with the Assembly, and where Council recommenda-
tions are not approved, they will be referred back to the Council for
reconsideration.
7 8
75. Ibid. at 528.
76. E.g., replacing "developing countries" by "developing states." See Nandan & Rosenne, supra
note 7 at 945.
77. Supra note 2, Article 162(2)(o)(i).
78. Ibid., Article 160(2)(f)(i).
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III. Interpretation of Article 82
Despite the simplicity of the basic idea and text in Article 82, textual
interpretation and eventual implementation can be expected to be more
complex. The text suffers from generality, lack of precision and ambigu-
ity, partly as a result of the consensus-building process. In interpreting
Article 82 and how it ought to apply, it will be necessary to be sensitive
to context (i.e., the negotiating history) and the modern operational en-
vironment of offshore development. It is likely to be necessary for LOS
Convention state parties to develop a common intention on how this
provision will apply, possibly through the Council and Assembly of the
Authority. In anticipating this exercise it is useful to consider the aspects
that need clarification.
1. The Basic Obligation
The basic obligation of the coastal state consists of the making of
payments or contributions in kind in respect of production from non-living
resources of the continental shelf beyond 200M and within the limit of the
continental margin within its jurisdiction as defined in accordance with
the rules and processes of Article 76. The coastal state decides whether to
discharge its obligation by means of payment of monies representing the
sum due, or by contribution in kind (e.g., making available a part of the
volume of the resource produced).
Article 82 imposes an international legal obligation on the state party,
i.e., Canada, and not on a subnational political unit or the producer. It
may be argued that in other conventions, when states intended a direct
application to specific entities, they did not limit the obligation to them-
selves purely in their capacities as state parties, but also tended to specify
the entities affected.79 For Canada, this may suggest that the payment or
contribution is a federal obligation. However, there are many other provi-
sions in the LOS Convention which provide rights and responsibilities for
79. See e.g. International Salvage Convention, 1989, 28 April 1989, U.K.T.S. 1996 No. 93; Protocol
of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships of 1973,
17 February 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61; International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, 29 November 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, as amended in 1976, 1225 U.N.T.S. 356, and 1992,
U.K.T.S. 1996 No. 87; International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 18 December 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57, as amended
in 1976, 16 I.L.M. 621 1984, 23 I.L.M. 195, 1992, 1996 A.T.S. 3. See also International Oil
Pollution Compensation Fund 1992, online: International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds <http:
//www.iopcfund.org/>.
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state parties without identifying domestic entities, including responsibili-
ties with regard to pollution from ships and seabed activities, and which
would be implemented through legislation and other measures at the
domestic level.80  The LOS Convention is different from other ocean
treaties in that it is considered a constitution for the oceans, hence the
generality of its text. Thus it would be unreasonable to conclude that the
obligation necessarily falls where it lies, and that it would not be domesti-
cally implemented as to create downstream fiscal burdens.
Naturally, Canada could, as a matter of political choice, fulfil this
obligation as a federal responsibility, which might well be the U.S.
approach. In such a scenario an interesting analogy could be the 1992
International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPCF), where contribu-
tions are levied on the basis of imported oil.81 The 1992 Fund is composed
of monies paid by entities in member states that receive more than 150,000
tonnes of "contributing oil" (crude or heavy fuel oil) transported by sea.
While the relevant authorities in member states inform the IOPCF of
quantities of oil received, the Fund invoices the entities concerned directly.
State parties have the option of paying the contribution, but in reality very
few states exercise this option. Canada is one such state. By regulation,
Canada requires reporting of contributing oil by persons receiving more
than 150,000 tonnes during the previous calendar year to the Director
of the Ship-Source Oil Pollution Fund (SSOPF).82 The SSOPF Director
then develops a national consolidated figure that is reported to the 1992
Fund, and in turn this forms the basis for the Canadian contribution.
8 3
Although Canada could have chosen to have eligible industry entities pay
the 1992 Fund contribution, it has refrained from such a decision at this
time. Whether there will be a similar disposition to Article 82 payments or
contributions remains to be seen. 84
80. LOS provisions in Part XII - Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment", supra
note 2.
81. International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 1992, supra note 79.
82. Marine Liability Regulations, S.O.R./2002-307, s.3(2) pursuant to the Marine Liability Act, S.C.
2001, c.6.
83. Ship-Source Oil Pollution Fund, Administrator's Annual Report 2000-2001 (Ottawa: SSOPF), at
47, 51. See also the Administrator's Annual Report 2001-2002 (Ottawa: SSOPF).
84. A levy was paid by industry until 1976, but not since then. The Minister of Transport is empow-
ered by statute to impose a levy for this purpose on imported or exported contributing oil, but has not
applied it to date. The levy is indexed annually to the consumer price index. Report 2001-2002, ibid.
at 2.
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A more likely scenario is one wherein Canada would implement the
international obligation through the domestic oil and gas royalty regime.
In addition to adding to royalty considerations for producers, it is also
conceivable that the royalty-sharing scheme with the provincial govern-
ments concerned may have to be adjusted.
2. Rising Scale for Payment of Contribution in Kind
The obligation has to be fulfilled on an annual basis commencing with
the sixth year of production. Thus the first five years of production are
"obligation free" and are intended as a grace period within which costs
may be recovered. With the sixth year the rate of payment or contribu-
tion will be one percent of the value or volume of production at the site.
Thereafter the rate will increase by one percent per year until the twelfth
year, when seven percent is reached and which will remain as a flat rate for
the remaining production life of the resource. It is interesting to note that
production "does not include resources used in connection with exploita-
tion," presumably referring to, for example, gas that may be re-injected
into a reservoir as a matter of good oil field practice to enhance further
production or which may be flared.
Prior to Canada's ratification of the LOS Convention, there was
potential doubt as to how this provision would have applied to oil and gas
projects, which could have been in production prior to ratification. The po-
tentially different interpretations of the commencement of the grace period
for a producing field are as follows:
0 The grace period begins to run from the effective date of ratification
of the LOS Convention.
0 The grace period begins to run at the prior time of first
production.
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There are no grandfathering provisions within the LOS Convention that
would apply to Article 82. One way of dealing with this difficulty is
to permit the commencement of the grace period from when the LOS
Convention enters into force for the state concerned. Admittedly, this may
result in a longer grace period than originally intended by the UNCLOS III
negotiators, but then the five-year grace period is operative only when the
LOS Convention is in force for the state party concerned. Although no
longer an issue for Canada, it is potentially an issue for non-state parties,
85. Under this second interpretation, there would be no grace period where first production occurred
more than five years prior to ratification of the LOS Convention.
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such as the U.S. However, U.S. practice seems to have anticipated this situ-
ation in relation to exploration licenses in the Gulf of Mexico. A clause in
exploration licenses cautions industry that a special royalty charge may be
applicable in relation to future development outside 200M.8"
As seen earlier, the intention of the initial five "obligation free" years
was to allow for some level of recovery of development costs before the
royalty would apply. It might be argued that this five year royalty-free
period would allow the coastal state to accumulate domestic royalties un-
der local laws before being obliged to make payments and contributions
thereafter. Alternatively, it may also be argued that the royalty-free period
reflects a similar domestic arrangement in some coastal states where roy-
alties would increase after an initial period when royalties would be at a
lesser amount due to initial development costs. Another issue may be the
sufficiency of the current grace period to fully recover the initial explora-
tion and development costs, let alone continuing production costs.
3. Quantification of Payment or Contribution in Kind
It is not entirely clear what is meant by "value" of production at the site,
but has been interpreted by some as referring to the "well-head value."
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This would suggest the market price per barrel, in the case of oil, at the
wellhead. The "value" of each unit of production to the producer is argu-
ably the "net revenue" (i.e., the revenue for the product less the costs of
production). The negotiating history of Article 82 suggests, however, that
a "net revenue" model which was proposed by some states was ultimately
rejected due to other states anticipating difficulties in agreeing upon what
costs should be deducted in arriving at a net revenue figure. 88 It was
argued that a gross production value or volume would have the virtue
of easy measurement and greater certainty. On this basis it appears that
"value" would be interpreted as fair market value at the wellhead.
A second argument for the interpretation of "well-head value" is
based on the likelihood that "value" and "volume" were intended to be of
equal value. Article 82 appears to leave it to the coastal state to determine
whether there shall be a payment of value or a contribution in kind or
volume. Presumably, that contribution to the Authority was expected to
86. Communication from Michael W. Lodge, Chief, Office of Legal Affairs, International Seabed
Authority, Kingston, Jamaica, dated 10 July 2003.
87. U.S. delegation report on the Third Session, Geneva, 17 March-9 May, 1975 in Nordquist &
Park, supra note 44 at 98-99.
88. Including the U.S. See U.S. delegation report on the Third Session, ibid.
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be of similar value. Therefore, an interpretation of "value" based on the
"net revenue" model would result in something which could be signifi-
cantly less in value than the contribution of a percentage of the volume of
production at the site.
If the coastal state chooses to make payments based on the applicable
percentage of the value of production, this may raise practical issues
of concern to the Authority, including whether the payments would be
made in a currency which may not be as easily tradeable as other world
currencies. A choice to make contributions in kind raises other practical
questions and difficulties including the requirement for the Authority to
make transportation and risk management arrangements to receive its
percentage of the volume of production. Article 82 is silent on when such
payments or contributions shall be made other than that it be on an annual
basis. The timing of payments or contributions may have an effect on the
ultimate value, given the commodity price fluctuations.
It is likely that the uncertainty here and the modalities of the royalty
cannot be addressed by the Council or Assembly of the Authority alone,
and will need to be negotiated (presumably by the Secretariat of the Au-
thority, as it may be mandated by the Council) with the state concerned.
IV. Impact of International Royalty on Offshore Development in
Atlantic Canada
While the obligations under Article 82 are clearly the coastal state's, there
is obviously a concern amongst those with interests beyond the 200M limit
that the federal government may seek to recover all or some portion of its
international royalty obligations. While this raises a concern in respect of
all potential future projects beyond the 200M limit, the concerns are even
more pronounced for those license areas where exploration and develop-
ment costs were incurred prior to ratification and for all licensed areas for
which financial commitments have been made, whether yet incurred or
not. This raises a mix of legal and political issues.
For existing exploration licenses, significant discovery licenses, and
production licenses at the time of ratification of the LOS Convention,
several legal questions would arise in the event the federal government
imposes a domestic royalty on production to mirror and fund its obliga-
tions under Article 82. Could it be argued that subjecting such licenses
and projects to further production royalties would constitute an effective
expropriation without compensation? Would the answer depend upon
whether the government had the option to impose a payment obligation
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or require delivery of a percentage of the volume of production? Could
such license holders argue that they are already subject to a comprehensive
royalty regime with respect to production and may not be subjected to
further royalties? Would the producer's position differ if it had entered
into a royalty agreement or whether it was simply operating under a
generic royalty regime?
A detailed examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this
paper. It would be prudent for producers with interests beyond the 200M
limit or those contemplating the acquisition of such interests to consider
these questions further. It may be necessary to seek protection by way of
royalty agreements or otherwise to address these concerns to the extent
such protection may be available.89 To the extent these concerns cannot be
accommodated, projects beyond the 200M limit will need to be assessed
with regard to all of the potential costs, including the potential for mirror
obligations to the international royalty.
If a domestic royalty regime is implemented to address Article 82,
such obligations will need to be administered, which raises questions
about whether existing or new governmental agencies would be required
to administer such a program. A second question is whether industry or
government (federal and provincial) will bear the increased administrative
costs.
V. Policy Considerations
It is clear that the international royalty, if imposed on the producer, would
represent a significant additional cost to the project. Clearly the possibility
exists that certain projects may not be viable when this additional cost is
included. Many stakeholders benefit when a project proceeds to develop-
ment and production. The resulting income taxes, other taxes, salaries and
wages, contributions to the economy and existing royalties would all be
lost if such projects do not proceed. Clearly this is an important policy
consideration for those who will decide how to fund Canada's interna-
tional royalty obligations under Article 82.
Should Canada's treaty obligations be borne solely by the companies
who have risked significant capital to explore for, develop and produce oil
89. For a detailed discussion on the benefits of royalty agreements in the Atlantic Canada offshore
see Alan T. Pettie, "Are Royalty Agreements Required for Canada East Coast Offshore Oil and Gas?"
(2001) 24 Dal. L.J. 151.
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and gas in harsh conditions beyond the 200M limit? Is this an obligation
which should be borne by all taxpayers or by the producers? Should it be a
shared obligation? Given that the international royalty will be distributed
by the Authority to states who are party to the LOS Convention "taking
into account the interests and needs of developing countries, particularly
the least developed and the land-locked amongst them," one policy posi-
tion might be that such payments represent an international redistribution
of wealth based on the policy priorities of the federal government. This
would be similar to Official Development Assistance (ODA), except
that ODA is normally funded out of general revenues. Should the federal
government look solely to the royalty revenue under the current royalty
regimes as its source of funding for this international royalty? After all,
one of the benefits of the LOS convention is to sanction the exercise of
economic control over the extended continental shelf for a number of
purposes. The federal government clearly benefits from such activities.
The international royalty is merely a price to be paid for these additional
benefits.
The imposition of domestic royalties on production beyond the 200M
limit could create an inequity between projects which are on either side
of the line. Projects with otherwise similar risks, exploration costs and
development costs would nevertheless have very different economic
values and feasibility thresholds. The point here is that there could be
significant issues of equity among producers that could cause substantial
difficulties for the governments involved. The policy and related legal
issues may need to be resolved in the political forum.
Conclusions
This paper has explored several aspects of Article 82 of particular concern
to the Atlantic offshore oil and gas industry and the federal and provincial
stakeholders for the industry. To date there is no state practice or inter-
governmental guidelines to provide guidance on how this provision in the
LOS Convention might be applied. Despite the lengthy negotiations of this
provision at UNCLOS III, there is surprisingly little guidance on how the
provision should be implemented. Most of that discussion focused on the
principle of benefit sharing, the extent of that sharing and when it would
start, and finally on the institution responsible for administering the bene-
fits. There was little consideration of the technicalities of implementation.
It can be expected that the future agenda of the International Seabed
Authority will have to include deliberations on the extent of its jurisdiction
in the administration of Article 82, how payments and contributions may
be received, and how these funds may be used for the benefit of develop-
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ing countries. It can be expected that the uncertainty that the industry will
experience as a result of Article 82 will be equally shared by the Authority,
since it is tasked with administering the receipts.
One way of managing that uncertainty is for Canada to participate
in and contribute to the Authority's work. As long as Canada was not a
party to the LOS Convention, it could not participate in the Council or
Assembly. Together with coastal states, the Council and Assembly will
have an important role to play in proposing modalities for the implementa-
tion of Article 82. The thirty-six members of the Council are elected from
amongst state parties. Canadian ratification of the LOS Convention has
now enabled it to become a candidate for the Council and to position itself
to advocate for its offshore oil and gas interests.
Canada should consider commencing a consultative process with
the interested provincial governments and industry to anticipate the mo-
dalities and equities of Article 82 in the context of the Canadian petro-
leum law and royalty regimes. From a regional economic development
perspective, it has to be borne in mind that additional financial burdens on
industry in relation to what are risky and expensive developments on the
extended continental shelf can mean the difference between field viability
or the lack thereof. The Atlantic Provinces which are seeking a greater
share of the offshore oil and gas royalty, may not be willing to share in the
burden of such an international obligation. In the alternative, the federal
government might need to consider whether it should assume Article 82
payments or contribitions, possibly as Official Development Assistance,
or an additional contribution to the UN system, or simply as a commitment
similar to the Ship-Source Oil Pollution Fund payments into the Interna-
tional Oil Pollution Compensation Fund on behalf of Canada and large oil
importers. The alternative is for the federal and provincial governments
to provide more generous incentives to extended shelf producers. This, in
turn, may adversely affect government revenues. In any event, the politi-
cal solutions to these issues will likely involve multi-lateral consultations
and negotiations.
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Annex I: Evolution of Article 82 in the UNCLOS III Negotiating Texts
- ISNT, 1975, Art. 69 - RSNT, 1976, Art 70 - ICNT, 1977, Art. 82 Art. 82 of:
- ICNT Rev. 1, 1977
- ICNT Rev. 2, 1980
- Draft Convention
(informal Text), 1980
- Draft Convention, 1981
- LOS Convention, 1982
1. The coastal State shall 1. The coastal State shall 1. The coastal State shall 1. The coastal State shall make
make payments or contribu- make payments or contribu- make payments or contribu- payments or contributions in
tions in kind in respect of the tions in kind in respect of the tions in kind in respect kind in respect of the exploita-
exploitation of the non-living exploitation of the non-living of the exploitation of the tion of the non-living resources
resources of the continental resources of the continental non-living resources of the of the continental shelf beyond
shelf beyond 200 nautical shelf beyond 200 nautical continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the
miles from the baselines from miles from the baselines from 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
which the breadth of the ter- which the breadth of the ter- baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
ritorial sea is measured. ritorial sea is measured. breadth of the territorial sea measured.
is measured.
2. The rate of payment or 2. The payments and 2. The payments and 2. The payments and contribu-
contribution shall be ... per contributions shall be made contributions shall be made tions shall be made annually
cent of the value or volume annually with respect to all annually with respect to all with respect to all production at
of production at the site. production at a site after the production at a site after the a site after the first five years of
Production does not include first five years of production first five years of production production at that site. For the
resources used in connection at that site. For the sixth at that site. For the sixth sixth year, the rate of payment
with exploitation. year, the rate of payment or year, the rate of payment or contribution shall be one
contribution shall be ... per or contribution shall be one per cent of the value or volume
cent of the value or volume per cent of the value or of production at the site. The
of production at the site. The volume of production at the rate shall increase by one
rate shall increase by ... per site. The rate shall increase per cent for each subsequent
cent for each subsequent by one per cent for each year until the twelfth year and
year until the tenth year and subsequent year until the shall remain at seven per cent
shall remain at ... per cent tenth year and shall remain thereafter. Production does not
thereafter. Production does at five per cent thereafter. include resources used in con-
not include resources used in Production does not include nection with exploitation.
connection with exploitation, resources used in connection
with exploitation
3. The International Authority 3. The International Authority 3. A developing country 3. A developing country/State*
shall determine the extent to shall determine if and to what which is a net importer of a which is a net importer of a
which developing countries extent developing countries mineral resource produced mineral resource produced from
shall be obliged to make shall be obliged to make from its continental shelf is its continental shelf is exempt
payments or contributions payments or contributions exempt from making such from making such payments or
provided for in paragraphs provided for in paragraphs payments or contributions contributions in respect of that
I and 2. 1 and 2. in respect of that mineral mineral resource.
resource.
4. The payments or contribu-
tions provided for in para-
graphs I and 2 shall be made
to the International Authority
on terms and procedures
to be agreed upon with the
Authority in each case. The
International Authority shall
distribute these payments and
contributions on the basis of
equitable sharing criteria, tak
ing into account the interests
and needs of developing
countries.
4. The payments or contribu-
tions shall be made to the
International Authority on
terms and procedures to
be agreed upon with the
Authority in each case. The
International Authority shall
distribute these payments and
contributions on the basis of
equitable sharing criteria, tak-
ing into account the interests
and needs of developing
countries, particularly the least
developed amongst them.
4. The payments or
contributions shall be made
through the Authority, which
shall distribute them to
States Parties to the present
Convention, on the basis of
equitable sharing criteria, tak-
ing into account the interests
and needs of developing
countries, particularly the
least developed and the
land-locked amongst them.
4. The payments or contribu-
tions shall be made through the
Authority, which shall distribute
them to States Parties to this
Convention, on the basis of
equitable sharing criteria, taking
into account the interests and
needs of developing countries/
States*, particularly the least
developed and the land-locked
amongst them.
*With ICNT Rev.2, the precise wording that would appear in the LOS Convention was adopted. The last change was substitution of 'state(s)' for
'country(ies)' in paragraphs 3 and 4.
